
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 6, 2021, a physical breach of U.S. Capitol Building security occurred during a Joint Session of Congress to certify the Electoral College vote. See Appendix A for the United States Capitol Police's (USCP or Department) official timeline of events leading up to and during the physical security breach.

In accordance with our statutory authority Public Law (P.L.) 109-55, the USCP Office of Inspector General (OIG) began a review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Our objectives for this review were to determine if the Department (1) established adequate measures for ensuring the safety and security of the Capitol Complex as well as Members of Congress, (2) established adequate internal controls and processes for ensuring compliance with Department policies, and (3) complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws and regulations. The scope included controls, processes, and operations surrounding the security measures prior to the planned demonstrations and response during the takeover of the Capitol building. Based on ongoing work, this flash report is designed to communicate deficiencies with the Department's Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) and human capital.

DPD contributed toward the Department's mission through proper planning and successfully evacuating individuals under its protection during the events of January 6, 2021. However, DPD incurred authorization issues with staging evacuation vehicles on January 6, 2021. Additionally, DPD's training program lacked a dedicated training staff, facilities issues, and weapon system training integration. Lastly, DPD did not have a Plan of Action (POA) in place for January 6, 2021, experienced equipment issues with its issued ballistic vests, and was occasionally not in compliance with guidance.

USCP could not provide documentation supporting that it implemented Department-wide leave restrictions or cancellations, or that it issued Department-wide messages for recalls to duty. We identified deficiencies with the data for sworn Department employees as well as mutual aid training, coordination, and documentation. The lack of appropriately maintained employee information could have impeded the effectiveness of the Department's planning for responses to future events. The Department should define roles for responding agencies with pre-determined rally points, designate agency-specific roles based on agency expertise, and ensure employees potentially involved with incident management receive training to lead mutual aid resources. Additionally, the Department should immediately develop clear protocols to swear in responding agencies and retain appropriate records documenting such actions. See Appendix B for a complete list of recommendations.

Appendix B Page 1 of 2 *Listing of Recommendations*

41 *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol 2021-1-0003-G, October 2021* LAW

ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police elevate to the Police Board parking issues concerning Dignitary Protection Division's evacuation vehicles.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop a dedicated Dignitary Protection Division training cadre that reports to the Training Services Bureau.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police transfer Dignitary Protection Division training responsibilities to the Training Services Bureau.

Recommendation 4: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police prioritize training resources for the Dignitary Protection Division such as exploring options for additional training facilities and increased scenario-based training with various weapon systems.

Recommendation 5: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police prioritize staffing the Dignitary Protection Division.

Recommendation 6: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police's Dignitary Protection Division develop a Plan of Action for large events.

Recommendation 7: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police explore ballistic vest options that accommodate the Dignitary Protection Division's mission needs.

Recommendation 8: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police immediately enforce the requirement for information exchange as detailed in Standard Operating Procedure PS-200-45, *Information Exchange Between DPD and other Entities within PSB*, dated November 5, 2014.

Recommendation 9: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police maintain records that properly identify employee counts and status related to staffing levels.

Recommendation 10: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police define roles for responding agencies with pre-determined rally points, designate agency-specific roles based on agency expertise, and ensure employees potentially involved with incident management receive training to lead mutual aid resources.

Appendix B Page 2 of 2 *Listing of Recommendations*

42 *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol 2021-I-0003-G, October 2021* LAW

ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Recommendation 11: We recommend that the United States Capitol Police develop clear protocols to swear in responding agencies and retain appropriate records documenting such actions.